THE STATE AS A RATIONAL ACTOR IN THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS: A STUDY OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962

The Cuban missile crisis marked the climax of the Cold War geopolitical rivalry between the US and Soviet Union. On 24 October, 1962, the United States discovered Soviets installed nuclear missiles in Cuba, and President J.F Kennedy immediately ordered naval blockade of Cuba and placed American nuclear forces on unprecedented state of alert. This led to tensions and confrontations between the two Super powers. However, the two leaders; President J.F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev recognized that nuclear war can lead to total obliteration of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and adopted constructive diplomacy, and collective rationality approach in the resolution of the crisis. On 28 October, 1962, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet missiles system in Cuba would be dismantled and shipped back to the Soviet, and the U.S. pledged not to invade Cuba and to dismantle its Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The peaceful resolution of the crisis led to policy of détente and peaceful coexistence that lasted up to 1970s, and banning of the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere in 1963. The paper posits that the establishment of telephone hotline between Moscow and Washington fostered effective communication between the two leaders. The paper concludes that the collective rationality approach adopted by the two leaders was due to their intelligent appreciation of the danger of a nuclear war, and signifies superiority of diplomatic approach to international crisis, and wholly attests the State is a rational actor in the management of international crisis.